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Abstract
This paper exploits the 2008-09 stamp duty holiday in the United
Kingdom to estimate the incidence of a transaction tax on housing.
We nd that there was an average reduction in the post-tax sale price
of around $900, out of an average tax reduction of about $1500.
Under the new tax regime, the increase in transactions of properties
a¤ected by the stamp duty holiday was about 8%, though most of this
e¤ect was rapidly reversed after the policy was withdrawn. We cali-
brate these ndings to a bargaining model and show this implies that
about sixty percent of the surplus generated by the holiday accrued
to buyers. Using this model, we also estimate an upper bound for the
deadweight loss of the tax at around 4% of the revenue raised.
JEL classication: H22, R32.
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1 Introduction
Transactions taxes, especially on real estate, are an important source of gov-
ernment revenues. A wide range of countries levy such taxes on property
and proposals abound to extend their domain to a range of nancial trans-
actions.1 One key question is who ends up paying it, the classical incidence
question.2 Although the tax is remitted by the buyer, we would expect it
to be a part of the negotiation over the price.3 In practice, the bargain-
ing protocols associated with bargaining over real estate in this context are
complex  see, for example, Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004). Following
the extensive experimental literature on bargaining and experiments, see for
example Roth (1995), we would expect some kind of surplus sharing. In-
deed ultimatum games frequently lead to surplus sharing, especially among
inexperienced bargainers.4
Another important issue is how the tax a¤ects transactions as this deter-
mines the ine¢ ciency created by the tax. While there is a sizeable literature
on standard property taxes levied on owners or tenants, see for example
Zodrow (2001), relatively little but growing attention has been paid to the
incidence of transactions taxes on property.
As a form of taxation, stamp duties have a long history in the United
1The U.K. is not unusual in taxing property transactions. Such taxes exist in Aus-
tralia, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and the U.S. (see for instance
Oxley and Ha¤ner, 2010). In the latter, taxes vary by state (see Federation of Tax
Administrators, 2006).
2See Kotliko¤ and Summers (1987) for a summary of the older tax incidence literature.
3Some U.S. states appear to have developed conventions on this, assigning tax payments
fty-fty to buyers and sellers but this does not imply that this is the nal incidence as
buyers and sellers can still bargain in the shadow of this rule.
4In a wide-ranging meta-study, Engel (2011) nds that on average individuals give a
little over 40% in the classic ultimatum game using a sample of over 600 laboratory studies.
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Kingdom. Originally they were applied to transactions of vellum, parchment
and paper in 1694 to pay for the war with France. Success saw the extension
of items liable for stamp duty (despite the role of the 1765 Stamp Act in the
movement for U.S. Independence) with housing transactions incorporated by
1808. Today Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) is charged on land and property
transactions in the United Kingdom with a varying rate and band structure
related to the nominal value of those transactions. Stamp duties are also
applied to transfers of shares in U.K. listed corporations.
This paper exploits a tax holiday in the UK to estimate both price and
transaction e¤ects of stamp duty. The tax holiday was granted in partial
response to the global down turn in 2008. It cut stamp duty for a particular
range of transactions prices as detailed below. It was worth approximately
$1500 on the median transaction to which it applied. We use the stamp
duty holiday to construct treatment and control groups by using two facts.
First, the tax change was announced on the day immediately before its intro-
duction, making its timing largely unanticipated.5 Second, for a signicant
fraction of our dataset, we observe an independent valuation of the house by
an approved mortgage surveyor which is demanded by lenders as a condition
of granting a mortgage. This valuation reects the resale value of the prop-
erty in the event of default and we would not expect it to reect the holiday:
resale after default would almost certainly occur, if at all, after the tax hol-
iday had ended. Thus, this independent valuation can be used to assign a
property to the treatment group.
We estimate the average reduction in the post tax price of a house trans-
5Political leaks and media speculation may have led to some form of anticipation for
which we control using an independent database on media citations among the most widely
circulated British newspapers. We come back to this issue in section two.
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acted during the holiday window to be around $900 and we show that this
nding is robust to a variety of specications and robustness checks. We
also nd that housing transactions in the relevant price window increased by
around 8%. But this e¤ect is estimated to be insignicant if we exclude the
months immediately before and after the holiday end, thereby suggesting that
the signicant rise in purchases during the window was -at least partially-
compensated by a signicant fall afterwards. This suggests that most of the
e¤ect on volumes was due to a change in the timing of transactions.
To give these e¤ects an economic interpretation, we present a simple
bargaining model of house price determination. This allows us to decompose
the e¤ect of the tax holiday into a term which reects the distribution of
bargaining power between buyers and sellers and a selection term reecting
the fact that the tax a¤ects which transactions take place during the tax
holiday. We show how our estimated e¤ects can be used to identify these
components separately. This is because bargaining power does not a¤ect
whether a transaction happens. We nd that buyers were able, on average,
to capture about sixty percent of the tax saving during the holiday window.
The model can also be used to give a back of the envelope sense of the welfare
cost of raising revenues via levying stamp duty on housing transactions.
Selected literature review. A young but rapidly growing literature
has looked at the e¤ects of tax changes on housing transactions across ge-
ographical regions, over time and at di¤erent points of the sale price dis-
tribution. Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn (2005) study the impact of
transaction taxes in the Netherlands on residential mobility. Dachis, Duran-
ton and Turner (2012) use a regression discontinuity design to identify the
e¤ects of Torontos imposition of a Land Transfer Tax on the timing and
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location of real estate purchases in early 2008. They estimate that the 1:1%
tax generated a 15% decline in transaction volumes in the Toronto area, a
decline in sale prices about equal to the tax and a welfare loss of about $1
for every $8 in tax revenue.
Another stream of research analyse the distortions on the house price
distribution introduced by di¤erent aspects of the tax system in the United
States and United Kingdom. Slemrod, Weber and Shan (2012) report ev-
idence of manipulative sorting around the price notch, but not around the
time notch, generated by a reform in Washington D.C. on residential real
estate transfer taxes. Kopczuk and Munroe (2013) study the incidence of
a tax on houses transacted above $1 million in the states of New York and
New Jersey. Exploiting the discontinuity on the overall tax liability asso-
ciated with the so-called 1% mansion taxand the consequential bunching
of transactions just below that threshold, they nd that most of the sur-
plus generated by the tax accrues to sellers. While sharing the emphasis on
tax incidence, we look at a rather di¤erent segment of the market, namely
houses transacted in the range £ 125,000-£ 175,000 and rely on a tax holiday
as source of exogenous variation.
The paper most closely related to our analysis is Best and Kleven (2013)
who exploit several discontinuities in the U.K. stamp duty system of tax
liability to estimate the impact of a scal stimulus in the housing market on
the aggregate economy. Using the universe of transactions available from the
Land Registry o¢ ce, they provide strong evidence of bunching just below
the thresholds that trigger a higher rate on the whole sale price and estimate
signicant, but short-lived, e¤ects of the 2008-09 tax holiday on real activity.
Our analysis, in contrast, focuses on the incidence of the surplus generated by
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the tax holiday (and the associated welfare gain) using an empirical strategy
that, while controlling for notches and missing transactions in the distribution
of sale prices, is based on surveyors valuations.
2 Data and policy design
We use a dataset on mortgage transactions from the main nancial regulator
in the UK, the formerly Financial Services Authority (FSA), now Pruden-
tial Regulation Authority (PRA). It is compiled from mortgage lenders
returns which are submitted to the FSA/PRA for regulatory purposes. The
dataset includes characteristics of the mortgage loan at origination such as
the loan size, the date at which the mortgage is issued, the purchase price
of mortgaged property and, for signicant portion of the transactions, an
independent surveyor valuation of the property. It also includes borrower
characteristics such as the age of the main borrower, the total household
income on which the mortgage advance is based, the previous tenure of the
household. We also know the region in which the house was purchased.
2.1 The 2008-09 stamp duty holiday
Following the onset of the global nancial crisis in 2007-08, activity in the
U.K. housing market and the economy more broadly slowed sharply. By the
summer of 2008 economic surveys suggested that the economy would su¤er a
second successive quarter of falling output in 2008 Q3, entering a recession.
In the residential housing market, house prices had declined by around 4%
in 2008 Q2, and were around 9% down on a year earlier. As shown in Figure
1, indicators of activity had also declined substantially with the number of
loan approvals falling by 70 in the year to June 2008.
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The U.K. government decided to try to stimulate the housing market by
cutting stamp duty land tax (SDLT) on housing transactions for lower value
transactions. Figure 2 charts media speculation on the topic which reached
fever pitch in late summer just before the government announced a change
on 2nd September 2008.
SDLT works on a slab- band and varying rate structure - basis. The
SDLT rate for the band within which a transaction value falls is imposed
on the buyer and applies to the entire purchase price, including elements
within lower bands.6 With the marginal rate of SDLT applying to the entire
purchase, discontinuities are generated around the thresholds to each band
in the UK tax system. In the full FSA/PRA sample, around 25% of property
transactions are between $125; 000, the lower threshold above which SDLT
was liable prior to 3rd September 2008 and after 31st December 2009, and
$175; 000, the lower threshold during the holiday period.
On 2nd September 2008, the UK government announced a tax holiday,
raising the lower threshold for SDLT liability from $125; 000 to $175; 000
with immediate e¤ect: i.e. for transactions on or after 3rd September 2008
and lasting until 3rd September 2009. In the government 2009 budget (an-
nounced in April 2009), the holiday was extended to transactions completed
before 31st December 2009, and it was conrmed that the lower threshold
would revert back to $125; 000 from 1st January 2010.7 The tax relief o¤ered
6The gap between taxes owned and taxes paid to Her Majesty Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) on housing transactions is about 4-5% of the true tax liability, a value lower than
the estimates for other UK taxes (Best and Kleven, 2013). This suggests that tax evasion
is likely to be limited in this market.
7In the government March 2010 budget, the lower threshold for rst time buyers was
lifted to $250; 000 until 24th March 2012. To control for policy as well as non-policy
factors a¤ecting this segment of the market, we will add a dummy for rst-time buyers in
all specications. The results below are robust to ending our sample in March 2010.
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was 1% of the total purchase price. All higher SDLT rates and bands were
left unchanged.8
Figures 1 and 3 suggest that the SDLT policy intervention may have had
some success in boosting housing market activity during the holiday window
(grey area) as well as in breaking the downward trend in UK house prices
observed prior to its introduction. A formal econometric analysis, however,
requires isolating the unanticipated e¤ect of the tax change as well as control-
ling for macroeconomic conditions and regional developments. To this end,
we will use, in section four, a simple theoretical framework to interpret the
estimates of section three. The goal is to identify who beneted most from
the 2008 stamp duty holiday as well as evaluate the impact of this policy
change on housing market activity.
For the period that concerns us, the raw data covers over 1.1 million
transactions for house purchases starting in March 2008 and nishing at the
end of June 2010. This time span captures all transactions six months either
side of the stamp duty holiday period. We choose a period of six months
prior to the holiday window to minimize the impact of changes in the macro-
economic environment as well as to keep households in the treatment and
control groups relatively homogeneous. Furthermore, we will augment our
empirical specications with household-specic demographics and macroeco-
nomic variables as controls to assess the robustness of our ndings.
The sample is restricted to observations where the mortgage is dened
as being for house purchase, and where there is both a purchase price and
8As of 2013, there are six tax bands in the UK stamp duty system: (i) no tax liability
for properties with sale price below $125; 000, (ii) 1% between $125; 000 and $249; 999,
(iii) 3% between $250; 000 and $499; 999, (iv) 4% between $500; 000 and $999; 999, (v)
5% between $1; 000; 000 and $1; 999; 999 and (vi) 7% above $2; 000; 000. As the relevant
rate applies to the whole transaction price, the system implies that the tax liability changes
discontinuously at each of the six sale price thresholds.
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a surveyor price indicated. For the purposes of assessing the incidence of
the stamp duty, we focus on purchasers whose houses were associated with
a surveyors valuation between $125; 000 and $174; 999. More specically,
we will compare the change in their post-tax transactions price associated
with the SDLT holiday to the change in the transaction price for two groups
which, according to the surveyors valuation, are either in the $100; 000-
$124; 999 or in the $175; 000-$200; 000 tax bracket throughout our sample,
and therefore did not benet from the tax holiday. By using the surveyors
valuation, we avoid selecting on our endogenous variable, the transaction
price. By looking also at transactions in the segments of the housing market
with sale prices immediately above and below the price range targeted by the
scal intervention, we are able to control for seasonal and common factors
that are likely to a¤ect transactions on a range of relatively similar properties,
at least as measured by their surveyors valuation. These will naturally lead
to a di¤erence-in-di¤erence interpretation of the estimates presented in this
paper.
2.2 Summary Statistics
Our full sample spans the period March 2008 to June 2010, which will be fur-
ther split into the holiday period, from 3rd September 2008 to 31st December
2009, and the non-holiday periods, from 1st March 2008 to 2nd September
2008 and 1st January 2010 to 30th June 2010. We focus on three groups
of transacted houses with surveyors valuation: (i) in the range [$100; 000,
$125; 000), (ii) in the range [$125; 000, $175; 000) and (iii) in the range
[$175; 000, $200; 000].
To minimize the impact of outliers, we also exclude transactions with
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post-tax purchase price outside the range $100; 000-$200; 000 as well as
transactions in the top 0:1 percentile of the distribution of percentage de-
viation between surveyors valuation and purchase price.9 Altogether, these
restrictions give us a sample size of around 315; 000 observations, which are
summarized in Table 1 according to whether each of the three groups is
observed during or outside the holiday period.
A number of interesting features emerges from the descriptive statistics
in Table 1. First, there seems to be little systematic variation in the mean
and standard deviation of surveyors valuations in each group across the two
periods. This is consistent with the idea that surveyors were ignoring the
short term impact of the stamp duty holiday on transactions prices since,
in the event of default, it would almost certainly be the case that the house
would be sold beyond the stamp duty holiday window.
Second, in all groups, the average surveyors valuation is very close to the
average pre-tax purchase price. This result, however, may be driven from
the fact that only in one quarter of the sample observations the surveyors
valuation di¤ers from the purchase price. In Figure 4, we report the distrib-
ution of the di¤erence between surveyor and purchase prices as a percentage
of the purchase price outside of (top panel) and during (bottom panel) the
holiday period, only for those transactions in which the two di¤er. For more
than 80% of the distribution, surveyor valuations appear evenly distributed
in the 10% neighborhood around the purchase price.
Third, the post-tax purchase price for transactions in the range [$125; 000,
9The latter restriction drops further 315 observations with a surveyors evaluation at
least 50% higher than the purchase price and thus more likely to reect special purchase
conditions (if not measurement errors) and other non-policy factors that are outside the
focus of this paper. Interestingly, we do not observe this type of outliers at the bottom of
the distribution, which gives further weight to the special factors interpretation relative
to measurement errors.
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$175; 000) occurred during the holiday period is, on average, about $550
lower than the average post-tax purchase price for the same group of trans-
actions which occurred six months either way of the new policy regime. On
the other hand, the average pre-tax purchase price for this group during
the holiday period is about $300 higher than the average pre-tax price paid
outside the holiday.
Fourth, in contrast to transactions with surveyors valuations in the range
[$125; 000, $175; 000), during the policy intervention the other two groups
witnessed a joint drop of similar size for the average pre-tax and post-tax
sale prices of about $500 (top panel) and $700 (bottom panel) respectively.
Fifth, in all groups there seems to be su¢ cient variation in post-tax purchase
price, whose conditional means are the focus of our empirical analysis.
Sixth, during the stamp duty holiday, the volume of house transactions
per month in the range [$125; 000, $175; 000) increased, on average, by
about 100 units at the regional level, corresponding to a 14% rise relative
to the non-holiday period. This contrasts with the other two groups which
experienced no signicant increase over the policy intervention period. Using
Figure 3, we can see that this corresponded to a 10% surge of the entire
market (i.e. irrespective of the surveyor price). Our dataset is supplemented
by a set of monthly macroeconomic data that will serve to control for regional
conditions.
2.3 Bunching
A key feature of stamp duty is that it creates a notch in the tax schedule. A
number of recent contributions including Slemrod, Weber and Shan (2012),
Kopczuk and Munroe (2013) and Best and Kleven (2013) show that the dis-
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continuity imposed by the type of housing transaction tax changes considered
in this paper generate (i) a notch in the sale distribution immediately before
the thresholds that trigger an higher rate on the whole transaction price and
(ii) a hole of missing transactions immediately after that. Indeed, Kopczuk
and Munroe (2013) show on U.S. data that this bunching e¤ect can extend
into the sale price distribution as far as 10% of the threshold value.
In this section, we develop an analysis similar to Best and Kleven (2013) to
show a similar pattern in our data. Figure 5 displays the density of property
transactions occurred between $100; 000 and $200; 000 per each month of
the holiday period and the two months either before or after that. These are
evaluated at either the transaction price (solid red line) or the surveyor valu-
ation (dashed blue line). While the two series tend to follow similar patterns
over time and across distributions, they also tend to diverge occasionally,
suggesting that surveyor valuations provide some independent information
relative to transaction prices. On the other hand, the distributions of sur-
veyors valuations also display some form of bunching around the $125; 000
threshold in the two months either side of the September 2008 start of the
holiday as well as around the $175; 000 threshold in the months immediately
before the December 2009 end. Furthermore, the rst two months after the
holiday end in the bottom right corner of Figure 5 reveal a swift move of
bunching from the just-below $175; 000 notch associated with the old sale
price threshold to the just-below $125; 000 notch associated with the new
sale price threshold. Interestingly, both towards the end of the holiday period
and then immediately afterward in January 2010 there is also evidence of a
hole, namely a drop in transactions immediately above the relevant threshold
in the sale price distribution.
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In the context of our analysis, bunching represents a serious concern as it
may contaminate the composition of the treatment and control groups. To
deal with this, we follow two incrementally conservative strategies. First, we
restrict our sample only to transactions that did not occur in the $10; 000
neighborhood of either the$125; 000 or$175; 000 thresholds. In other words,
our baseline specications run on three groups of transactions in the range:
(i) [$100; 000, $115; 000), (ii) [$135; 000, $165; 000) and (iii) [$185; 000,
$200; 000]. Second, we supplement the results from this baseline dataset
with further restricted versions which additively remove the pairs of months
for which we observe below-threshold bunching in line with the evidence in
Figure 5. The latter strategy will guard against the possibility that bunching
extended further than $10; 000 from the threshold value into the sale price
distribution.
3 Estimating the e¤ect of a tax holiday
We now present the core results of the paper which estimate the impact
of the stamp-duty holiday on prices and transactions. We begin with a
sparse core specication to which we add sequentially national and regional
characteristics to control for business cycle developments. We also assess the
extent of any possible time-variation in the average e¤ect of the stamp duty
holiday on transaction prices and volumes.
3.1 Transaction prices
We consider the impact of the stamp duty holiday on the post-tax purchase
price for transaction i in month s denoted by Pis, where s incudes all months
fromMarch 2008 to June 2010 and i incudes any transaction whose surveyors
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valuation lies in one of the three ranges [$100; 000, $115; 000), [$135; 000,
$165; 000) or [$185; 000, $200; 000]. Fixed-e¤ects for each price bracket
are captured by two dummies for the rst two ranges which we denote as
Gjs  fG1s; G2sg. A common holiday period e¤ect is absorbed by a dummy,
Ht, which takes value of one if month s belongs to the holiday period, t,
from September 2008 to December 2009, and zero otherwise. The treatment
dummy variable is the interaction between the dummy for the holiday period
and the dummy for the transaction group with surveyor valuations in the
range [$135; 000, $165; 000).
We use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach which compares the change in
the transaction price due to the holiday period (relative to the non-holiday
period) for the treatment group with the change in transaction prices for
two other groups where surveyor valuations are close to (above or below) the
range of sale prices targeted by the policy intervention. Specically, we use as
control groups properties priced in the [$100; 000, $125; 000) and [$175; 000,
$200; 000] ranges where there was no tax change between March 2008 and
June 2010. The identifying assumption is that these property price ranges
faced similar economic shocks to those in the treatment range over the period
in question.
To estimate the average price e¤ect, we run di¤erent versions of the fol-
lowing basic regression:
lnPis = 0 + 1  treatmentih + 2Gjs + 3Ht + 4Dis + 5Rrs + is (1)
where Dis refers to household-specic demographic characteristics, such as
log age, squared log age and a dummy for whether the transaction involved
a rst-time buyer. The vector of regional factors, Rrs  [HPrs; Urs; Zr],
includes house price ination based on the Halifax House Price Index, HPrs,
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the claimant count unemployment rate, Urs, and a full set of region-specic
dummies, Zr. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-regional correlation.
Column (1) in Table 2 presents estimates for the baseline specication
where we do not include national or regional controls. We nd that the 1%
stamp-duty reduction associated with the holiday period lowered the post-
tax price by 0:53%. According to our estimates, this translates into a sale
price change on the average transaction of around minus $830, a value in line
with the gures in Table 1. Column (2) replaces the holiday period dummy
with a full set of month xed-e¤ects. Column (3) adds controls for regional
factors. These specications lead to similar estimates for both the elasticity
1, now around minus 0:58%, and the implied nominal price change, now
about minus $860. All of the estimates in columns (1) through (3) are
statistically indistinguishable from one another.
The remaining columns in Table 2 are sensitivity checks based on various
sub-samples of the specication in column (3). Housing transactions typically
take some time to be completed, often with some element of uncertainty
around the completion date for the transaction. But the existence of the
holiday (or rumors of it) could have lead to transactions being speeded up or
delayed. To address the possibility that this a¤ects our results, we exclude
from the sample the two months before and after the beginning of the holiday.
Transactions two months before the holiday are excluded to clean our results
of any possible anticipation e¤ect. We then remove transactions two months
after the announcement to make sure our estimates are not contaminated
by housing contracts that were already agreed before September 2008 but
were completed only afterwards. We refer to this as the anticipationand
completionsub-samples. The choice of a two month window is based on
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the following reasoning. First, searching the FACTIVA electronic database
of daily U.K. newspapers with major circulation suggested some possible
anticipation of the policy change: as shown in Figure 2, we found the phrase
stamp duty holidaysreported 4 times in July and 80 times in August 2008.
Second, it is common practice in the U.K. mortgage market to complete a
housing market transaction within 90 days of contract exchange with the
typical lag being below 60 days. This suggests that a large proportion of
transactions observed in the rst months of the holiday period may have
been agreed before the policy change announcement.
Column (4) shows the results using the anticipationrestricted sample
and nds a slightly higher point estimate of minus 0:66% or minus $1000. On
the other hand, column (5) reveals a smaller e¤ect when we exclude the rst
two months of the holiday window, suggesting that buyers benetted most in
transactions agreed before the policy intervention but completed afterwards.
In column (6) and (7), we exclude observations in the two month window
before (end notch) and after (end hole) the deadline of 31st December 2009.
While both specications reveal some variation relative to the richest baseline
specication in column (3), these di¤erences are not statistically signicant.
Finally, in column (8), we exclude the two months either side of both the
holiday start and the holiday end dates. These restrictions are meant to purge
further our treatment and control groups by removing any residual bunching
e¤ect not fully captured by the $10; 000 exclusion restrictions around the
$125; 000 and $175; 000 thresholds. Reassuringly, the estimates in column
(8) are in line with the rest of the results.
Taken together, these results suggest a robust negative e¤ect of the stamp
duty holiday on house prices with an average magnitude of around minus
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$900 across all specications. In section four, we will discuss how these
coe¢ cients can be interpreted through the lens of a simple bargaining model
to provide an estimate of the tax incidence.
Temporal heterogeneity. We now look for evidence of time-variation
in the e¤ect of the tax change. In particular, we are interested in seeing
whether the estimated price e¤ect is inuenced by strategic considerations as
the tax holiday nears its end. To investigate this, we run a regression in which
the dummy variable treatmentis replaced by a full set of interaction terms
between the month xed-e¤ects during the holiday period and the group
dummy for transactions with surveyors valuation in the range [$135; 000,
$165; 000). We also include interaction terms between the dummy for this
group and the month xed-e¤ects outside the holiday period, but we have
veried that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of a single group-
specic dummy for all non-holiday months.
The ndings from this exercise are reported in Figure 6 in the form of
horizontal lines spanning the 95% condence band associated with the es-
timates of the monthly treatment e¤ects. As we have already discussed,
the rst months of the holiday period are likely dominated by transactions
whose purchase price was agreed prior to the government announcement but
that were completed after the holiday began, thereby generating a windfall
for the buyer. More generally, there is a slight tendency for the price e¤ect
to decline over time, especially towards the end of the holiday. But none
of the monthly e¤ects is statistically di¤erent from another, nor from the
time-invariant price e¤ect associated with the specication in column (3)
and whose 95% condence band is depicted by vertical red lines in Figure 6.
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3.2 Transaction volumes
To examine the e¤ect of the stamp-duty holiday on transactions volumes, we
aggregate our data at the regional level, for each surveyor valuation bracket
group and month. We then regress the log of the number of transactions
Nrgs in region r for the surveyor valuation bracket group g observed during
month s on the same type of dummies used in the price specication (1),
including the interaction term between the dummy for the holiday period
and the dummy for the transaction group with surveyor valuations in the
range [$135; 000, $165; 000) for region r, which is denoted as treatmentrgs.
We also include a full set of region-specic variables to yield:
lnNrgs = r0+ 1  treatmentrgh+ 2Gjs+ 3Ht+4Drgs+ 5Zrs+ rs (2)
where 2 and 3 are vectors and Zrs  [HPrs; Urs]. The specication also
include regional xed e¤ects, r0. Standard errors are adjusted for intra-
regional correlation.
The increase in housing transaction volumes associated with the SDLT
holiday period is estimated to be, on average, around 8% per region in the
most general specication with a full set of month xed-e¤ects in column
(3) of Table 2. The estimates are slightly larger in the restricted samples
that exclude the possibility of anticipation or completion e¤ects. But the
sharpest di¤erences emerge in the last three columns. More specically, the
estimated elasticities in columns (6) and (7), associated with the restricted
samples that drop either the two months before or after the 31 December
2009 deadline respectively, tend to be lower than in the previous columns.
These restrictions are meant to evaluate the extent to which the activity boost
generated by the housing scal stimulus was concentrated in the nal months
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of the holiday period and then swiftly reversed soon after the policy was
withdrawn: the evidence suggests so. The latter nding becomes even more
apparent in column (8) where the simultaneous exclusion of the two months
either side of both holiday start and holiday end leads to an insignicant 2:6%
volume increase. However, note that we also cannot reject the hypothesis
that the e¤ect in column (8) is the same as that in column (3).
Temporal heterogeneity. To investigate further the extent of time-
variation in the volume e¤ect, we run a regression that is similar to (2) but
with the variable treatment being replaced by an interaction between month
xed-e¤ects during the holiday period and the dummy for the group with
surveyor valuations in the range $135; 000 to $165; 000. In keeping with the
analysis for sale prices, we also include interaction terms between the monthly
dummies for the non-holiday period and the dummy for the intermediate sale
price group, though also here this is not crucial for our ndings.
The results are displayed in Figure 7 and cover (in the same format of
Figure 6) each holiday month. Unlike Figure 6, however, we also report
January 2010 in Figure 7 since this is the rst month after the stamp duty
holiday was withdrawn.10 Consistent with the ndings in columns (6) and
(7) of Table 2, December 2009 and January 2010 stand out as signicant
outliers, with elasticity point estimates of about +39% and  39% respec-
tively. Moreover, November and December 2009 are the only two months
characterized by signicant volume e¤ects within the holiday period. These
ndings suggest that the three months from November 2009 to January 2010
are the main drivers of the signicant estimate of 1 in the time-invariant
10Unlike its volume counterpart, the estimated price e¤ect for January 2010 is not
statistically di¤erent from zero and therefore is not reported in Figure 6.
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specication (2). The 95% condence band for 1 based on column (3) of
Table 2 are displayed as red vertical lines in Figure 7.
4 Interpretation and Welfare Analysis
The e¤ects that we estimated above are reduced form impacts and it is
unclear how to map them into anything of economic signicance. In this
section, we discuss how the reduced form results can be interpreted using a
generalized Nash bargaining model. This approach suggests a natural way
of estimating the welfare loss (excess burden) from the stamp duty.
While it might be tempting to infer the incidence of the stamp duty
holiday directly from the estimates of equation (1), this is problematic. To
see why, recall from Table 2 that housing transactions increased. And these
are housing transactions that would not have taken place had the holiday
not been in place. Thus, they are not a random sample of houses within the
treatment window. This point emerges more clearly from the theoretical
model that we present which also suggests a way of mapping the reduced
form estimates in (1) and (2) into interpretable e¤ects.
4.1 The Bargaining Model
Consider a world where a buyer and a seller are matched. The buyers
valuation of the sellers house is V . We denote the transaction price agreed
by a buyer and seller as p. The stamp duty rate is  2 f0; tg. The sellers
valuation of the house is u.
Suppose that buyer and seller bargain over the price and that the out-
come is generated by a generalized Nash bargaining solution where  2 [0; 1]
denotes the fraction of the net surplus that accrues to the buyer. Then, the
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bargain struck will pick the price that maximizes:
W (pj) = (V   (1 + ) p) (p  u)(1 ) (3)
Maximizing (3) with respect to p yields the following standard formula for
the post-tax price:
P  p (1 + ) = (1  )V + u (1 + ) (4)
Now write the di¤erence between buyers and sellers valuation as
V   u = "
This is a measure of the potential gain from trade, i.e. " is idiosyncratic
variation which means that the buyer values the house more or less than the
seller. Using this, (4) can be rewritten as:
P = u (1 + ) + (1  ) " (5)
We see from equation (5) that the tax term is multiplied by  which deter-
mines how far the tax increases the (gross) price.
Stamp duty prevents transactions that would otherwise be worthwhile
from taking place. Trade takes place only if:
"  u > 0 (6)
i.e. the buyer values the house su¢ ciently more than the seller to overcome
the need to pay a transaction cost in the form of a tax. Let G () be the
distribution of " in the population of interest.
Now consider the impact of a tax holiday where we divide observations in
the population of buyers and sellers into a treatment group, T , and a control
group, C where:
 =

0 s 2 T
t s 2 C
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The e¤ect on the price across the population of buyers and seller is
E (P :  = 0)  E (P :  = t) = [E fu :  = 0g   E fu :  = tg] (7)
 tE fu :  = tg
+(1  ) fE f" :  = 0g   E f" :  = tgg
and the e¤ect on transactions from tax holiday is given by
E fG (ut)g  G (0) (8)
where expectations in both cases are taken with respect to u. Equations (7)
and (8) are estimated in Table 2. An important observation is that only (7)
depends on .
4.2 Calibration Method
The key assumption that allows us to make a structure interpretation of the
coe¢ cients is that:
Assumption: E fuj = 0g = E fuj = tg
This says that sellersvaluations of houses available during the window do not
change. This will allow us to attribute all changes in prices due to demand
rather than supply side factors. Thus, the subsequent interpretation o¤ered
is only valid under this maintained hypothesis which can be thought of as an
identifying assumption. Next observe that
fE f" :  = 0g   E f" :  = tgg = E
Z tu
0
"dG (")

This reects the fact that some transactions which were deterred by the
stamp duty take place during the window. Our results on transactions
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suggest that this term is positive and we can use the transactions coe¢ cient
to estimate the size of this e¤ect.
We now have:
E (P :  = 0) E (P :  = t) =  tE fug+ (1  )E
Z tu
0
"dG (")

: (9)
The rst term reects surplus sharing and the second is the selection e¤ect
due to additional transactions taking place during the holiday period. To
explain our method, we take the point estimate of (9) from column (3) of
Table 2, minus 859, and use it as our benchmark. But we will also assess
the robustness of the ndings to looking across the 95% condence intervals
for these coe¢ cients.
4.3 Bargaining Power
To estimate , we need to measure the second term in (9). We will do this
by assuming that the distribution of the idiosyncratic valuation, ", is normal
with standard deviation . In this case:
E
Z tu
0
"
dG (")
G (tu) G (0)

= E
(
 (0)     tu



 
tu

   (0)
)
We can estimate  by evaluating this at the mean of u and using (8). Observe
then that from the most general specication in column 3 of Panel B in Table
2 with month xed-e¤ects, we have that:


tu


   (0) = 0:084
where u = E fug is estimated as the average of the independent surveyors
valuation ($149; 197) during the holiday period. This yields an estimate of
 =
tu
 1 (0:084 +  (0))
=
1492
0:211
= 7077
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It is then straightforward to compute the point estimate of the selection
term in (9) as:
E
Z tu
0
"dG (")

= 7077 0:0088 = 62 (10)
with the 95% condence set ranging from $37 to $220.11 Using the value in
(10), our estimate of the average bargaining power of the buyer is then:
^ =
859 + 62
1492 + 62
= 59:3%
Moreover, the surplus share appears precisely estimated with a standard
error of 11:1%. This says that the buyer captures close to two thirds of
the value of the tax holiday, on average, after adjusting for the selection
e¤ect. We repeat this exercise for the whole range of estimated values in
Panels A and B and report the outcomes in Panel C of Table 2. The point
estimates of the share being captured by the buyer range from 55% to 68%.
However, they are not statistically di¤erent from one another suggesting that
an estimate  of around 60% is a reasonable interpretation of the results.
4.4 Welfare E¤ects
The bargaining model also allows us to estimate a back-of-envelope welfare
cost associated with the stamp duty. To do this observe that total welfare
of those who own or buy houses aggregated across the population is
W (t) = u+
Z "
u
["  tp (t)] dG (")
11In the 95% condence interval, the estimates of  range from 14920:36 = 4155 to
1942
0:06 =
25046 and the estimated selection term E
R u
0
"dG (")
	
from 4155  0:0088 = 37 to
25046 0:0088 = 220.
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where p (t) solves (4) and " is the highest individual valuation in the 1% tax
bracket. The revenue raised is:
R () = p () [G (") G (u)] :
Then dene the cost of public funds, , associated with a stamp duty rate of
t from:
W (t) + R (t) W (0) = 0
i.e. the shadow value of public spending that would be needed to justify
levying a tax rate of t. In our case where t = 1%, we have that
 = 1 +
R ut
0
"dG (")
R (t)
= 1 +
62
1492
= 1:04
So for every pound of tax revenue raised, there is a 4% welfare loss.12 The
range of estimates in the 95% condence bands for the coe¢ cient  is 1:02%
to 1:15%.
For the purposes of this exercise, we have used the transaction e¤ect from
Table 2 column (3). But the fact that there is a large fall in transaction
volumes post-holiday (Figure 7) may suggest that this short-run transactions
e¤ect may be an upper bound for considering the long-run deadweight loss.
However, it would also be premature to conclude that a long-run elasticity of
zero constitutes a more reasonable estimate given the amount of noise that
the end of the window could bring to the timing of transactions. The main
story should be that even the short-run e¤ects that we estimate suggest a
rather low elasticity and hence deadweight loss associated with the stamp
duty. And recent e¤orts by the UK government to signicantly increase
12Of course, we have only estimated the loss associated with the lowest stamp duty band
and the e¤ect could be larger or smaller for higher bands.
25
stamp duty rates on high value properties certainly seem predicated on such
beliefs.13
5 Conclusions
This paper has looked at the incidence of a housing transaction tax in the
U.K. exploiting the fact that the government o¤ered a temporary unantic-
ipated tax holiday to a particular segment of the market. With access to
both the transactions price and the value of the house as reported by an
independent valuer, we are able to construct a natural treatment group to
identify the e¤ect of the holiday.
The results provide consistent evidence that a reasonable account of the
tax incidence is that the surplus created by the tax holiday accrued, on
average, for about sixty percent to the buyers. We also found evidence that
activity was boosted during the tax holiday window with a signicant, though
short-lived, increase of some 8% in transaction volumes for houses a¤ected
by the policy intervention.
While the context of our study is specic, it provides a benchmark study
for other cases where transactions taxes are in place. As with any tax,
there is a question of how far it deters transactions. The evidence from
the stamp duty holiday in the UK nds a sizeable behavioral response in
prices and quantities. This gives food for thought in debates to extend the
domain of transactions taxes into other areas, not least in the area of nancial
transactions.
13The estimated transaction volume elasticities and hence welfare costs are a good deal
lower than those in Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2012). This makes sense for cases
where like in their paperthe decision being studied is the choice of residential location
as a function of taxes.
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Figure 1: Residential property market activity and prices.
(a) Average of Halifax and Nationwide. The published Halifax index has been ad-
justed by the Bank of England to account for a change in the method of calculation.
(b) The swathe includes: HBF site visits, HBF net reservations and RICs new buyer
enquiries net balances; the RICs sales to stock ratio; and the number of loan approvals
for house purchase. HBF data are seasonally adjusted by Bank sta¤.
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Figure 2: Media citations of stamp duty holiday(a)
Source: Factiva. (a) Media citations from The Financial Times, The Guardian,
The Observer, The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph, The Independent, The
Independent on Sunday, The Times, The Sunday Times and The Mail on Sunday.
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Figure 3: Property transactions per month.
Source: The Financial Services Authority (Product sales database) and
Bank of England calculations.
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Figure 4: Density function of the di¤erence between surveyor price and pur-
chase price as % of purchase price.
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Figure 6: Average Price E¤ect by Month: 95% condence bands.
Credible sets for the average price di¤erence by month (in %s) are ob-
tained from an estimated model with regional controls, month xed-e¤ects for the
full sample and month-xed e¤ects specic to the treatment group. Horizontal
axes refer to the month-specic percent price change for the treatment group
during the holiday period. The vertical lines correspond to the 95% credible
set for the average price e¤ect of the holiday period using regional controls and
month-xed e¤ects (column 3 in Table 2).
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Figure 7: Average Price E¤ect by Month: 95% condence bands
Credible sets for the average volume di¤erence by month (in %s) are ob-
tained from an estimated model with regional controls, month xed-e¤ects for the
full sample and month-xed e¤ects specic to the treatment group. Horizontal
axes refer to the month-specic volume percent change for the treatment group
during the holiday period. The vertical lines correspond to the 95% credible set
for the average volume e¤ect of the holiday period using regional controls and
month-xed e¤ects (column 3 in Table 2).
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